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Abstract 
This paper uses asymmetric access to information to test if an insurgency is factionalized. If it 
is factionalized, regional variation in information should influence attack levels as groups use 
violence to compete over visibility, resources and support. Using plausibly exogenous 
variation in satellite access, we show that attacks increased after the release of information on 
satellite television about US commitment to remain in Iraq. Because insurgents shift attacks 
toward more difficult (military) targets, the relative increase in attacks is offset by fewer total 
fatalities. Our findings illustrate that insurgent groups may be decentralized strategic actors 
subject to competitive forces.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Internal conflicts, in the form of both civil wars and insurgencies, have gained increasing 
attention among policy makers and academics.  This interest has heightened since the United States has 
fought two protracted wars against insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraq war alone, which began 
in mid-2003 following the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the previous regime led by Saddam Hussein, 
has resulted in over 4,000 US military deaths, an estimated 91,000 violent Iraqi civilian deaths, and over 
100 billion dollars spent to rebuild the Iraqi economy. Over this time, over 4 million Iraqis have been 
displaced from their homes due to violence, about 14% of the total national population (UNHCR, 2007).  
The long-term burden from disease, the destruction of infrastructure, and wide scale social disorder will 
likely add thousands more lives and billions more dollars to the total costs (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008; 
ICRC, 2008; Bernasek, 2006).  These costs are particularly troubling since  policy-makers and analysts 
generally believe that these types of conflict—civil conflicts in which armed groups challenge the 
authority of the government, rather than international wars between states—are likely to be the dominant 
form of warfare facing the United States in the future (e.g., Gates, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
A growing body of research has started to apply econometric tools of analysis and formal models 
to better understand the factors that influence the behavior of insurgent organizations, and in particular the 
relationship between insurgent behavior and the military strategies employed to oppose them (Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004; Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007; Berman, Felter, and Shapiro, 2008; Berman 
and Laitin, 2005; Miguel and Blattman, 2009).  However, the existing literature often treats insurgencies 
as a single, centralized agent coordinating attacks on the government or occupation military forces.  In 
Iraq, as is the case in many recent civil conflicts, ―there appears to be no clear leader (or leadership), no 
attempt to seize and actually hold territory,…,no single, defined, or unifying ideology [and] most 
important, there is no identifiable organization‖ (Hoffman, 2006).
1  Decentralization may influence how 
insurgents groups compete for public support and treat the civilian population, as well how the collective 
                                                 
1 On the increasingly decentralized and ―networked‖ character of insurgencies, see Hoffman (2004), Kilcullen 
(2009) and Kilcullen (2009). According to Hoffman (2004), these types of insurgencies consist of ―flat, segmented 
networks instead of the pyramidal hierarchies and command-and-control systems…that have governed traditional 
insurgent organizations.‖   4 
insurgency responds to the military strategy of pro-government forces (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008).  Very 
little is known about the factors that influence decision-making within insurgent organizations in general: 
how groups allocate the timing, level, and targets of the violence they mobilize. Even less is known about 
the specific role competition over power and influence between insurgent groups plays in affecting the 
level of violence, the duration of the conflict, and the safety of the noncombatant population. 
In this paper, we use variation in satellite television access across different provinces in Iraq to 
examine whether new information about U.S. public support for continued military involvement in Iraq 
changes the behavior Iraq‘s decentralized insurgent groups.  Under a model with a centralized insurgency 
led by a single unified actor, information that can only be accessed regionally should not influence the 
level or nature of attacks between regions.  In contrast, a model in which an insurgency is factionalized 
between multiple groups, each group has an incentive to use violence to ―outbid‖ rival groups in the 
competition over visibility, scarce resources, and popular support (Bloom, 2005, McCormick, 2003).  If 
correct, indicators of future U.S. intentions should have an effect on insurgent decision-making in the 
context of Iraq, where violent opposition to the US occupation has been split between multiple groups 
with conflicting agendas, capabilities, and communal bases of support.  Under such a model, information 
about a decline in U.S. commitment to continued military involvement should affect the level of violence 
because the potential benefit for increased popular support increases.  Information about US commitment 
may also change the willingness of insurgent groups to engage in indiscriminate attacks that result in high 
levels of civilian fatalities. As the competition between insurgent groups for popular support escalates, 
attacks on civilians become more costly.  Any reduction in the expected future level of US engagement is 
therefore likely to have a different effect in decentralized versus centralized insurgencies.  
To distinguish between these organizational models, we construct an empirical test that exploits 
differences in access to news about U.S. politics across Iraq‘s 18 provinces.  Specifically, we combine 
data on U.S. military and Iraqi civilian fatalities resulting from insurgent violence, the release of U.S. 
public opinion towards the Iraq war, and access to satellite television media in Iraq. Satellite television 
access is a plausible source of exogenous variation in information because access in the years following   5 
the U.S. invasion was largely based on pre-war infrastructure and regional weather conditions. Under the 
assumption that provinces with greater access to satellite television have greater and more rapid exposure 
to U.S. news, we investigate whether insurgent groups in these areas respond differentially following the 
release of U.S. public opinion polls.   
Using a difference-in-difference estimate, we find that the frequency of attacks increased by 
between 5 and 15 percent in high satellite areas compared to low satellite areas in the two weeks 
following the release of new public opinion polls.  This difference dissipates by the fourth week. The 
results also show that the number of U.S. military fatalities increased by between 40 to 50 percent in the 
week following poll releases, while the number of Iraqi civilian casualties decreased by between 20 and 
30 percent. This evidence indicates that insurgent groups shift some attacks away from civilian targets 
and toward U.S. military targets. Because military targets are more difficult to successfully target, the 
relative increase in attacks is offset by fewer fatalities overall in high satellite access provinces compared 
to low satellite access provinces.   
There are several alternative causal paths, aside from inter-group competition, which may explain 
the differential change in the levels and targets of attacks across provinces.  First, if the timing of poll 
releases were related to prior trends in violence, then the observed effect would be due to U.S. media 
outlets conducting polls in response to rising or declining violence, and not the reverse.  To rule this out, 
we provide some evidence, in a restricted sample, that attack levels are not significantly different in high 
and low satellite regions prior to poll releases. In addition, evidence suggests media outlets do not release 
polls based on previous trends in violence in Iraq, but rather based on competition within the domestic 
U.S. media market.  A second concern is that satellite access in Iraq may be correlated with other 
important determinants of violence.  For such a correlation to bias our estimates, the effect of these 
determinants on violence must also change differentially in response to the release of polls.  To test this, 
we compare regions by ethnicity (Sunni versus Shia, a dominant social cleavage in Iraq) and oil 
production, and find no significant effect of either regional difference on attack levels before and after 
poll releases.  While the evidence we present is consistent with a decentralized competitive networks   6 
model of insurgent behavior, we are constrained by the limited data available on Iraqi insurgent groups.  
Despite this limitation, we do find consistent evidence, robust to specification, of changes in attack levels 
and targets in response to new information.  This finding is among the first of its kind to use observable 
information on both area characteristics and attacks to understand the structure and decisions of insurgent 
organizations.      
   This paper is organized as follows. Section II defines insurgency as a type of conflict and 
describes our causal argument regarding the impact of new information about the expected future level of 
US involvement on insurgent decision-making. Section III describes the data and methods used, and 
section IV discusses the results. Section V addresses possible problems with our identification strategy, 
including possible reverse causation bias, factors other than satellite access that might explain the results, 
and looking for an insurgent response over a relatively short time-frame. Section VI presents a 
conclusion.  
 
II. EFFECT OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN INSURGENCIES 
There is a great deal of debate about the classification of civil conflicts into insurgencies.  
Following the description in the existing literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), an insurgency is defined as 
a type of armed conflict in which one group uses irregular and guerilla military tactics to achieve the 
political goal of overthrowing the state.
2 ―Counterinsurgency‖ refers to the political and military actions 
taken by either the challenged government or an outside actor to defeat a rebellion. Because insurgent 
groups are generally weaker in conventional military terms, insurgent tactics are designed to avoid 
directly engaging the counterinsurgent‘s main strengths by using concealment and subversion to defeat a 
militarily stronger power.
3  Insurgent political objectives seek to challenge and delegitimize the existing 
government through the use of violence. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency‘s Guide to 
the Analysis of Insurgency (n.d.), insurgent activity is ―designed to weaken government control and 
                                                 
2 Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75). The Central Intelligence Agency‘s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency defines an 
insurgency as a ―protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the 
resources of the country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political mobilization.‖  
3 On insurgent military tactics, see Nagl (2002) and Krepenevich (1986).   7 
legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.‖ Insurgent tactics often but do not 
necessarily include terrorism, or the deliberate targeting of civilians for the purposes of inducing fear.
4  
Much of the discussion of insurgencies treats these groups as single entities competing for 
geographic or political control against the established state.  This treatment ignores an important aspect of 
Iraqi insurgency: the extent to which it is highly decentralized.
5 Unlike nationalist or secessionist 
insurgencies that are initiated and led by a single, unified group, the insurgency that emerged following 
the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq was fractionalized both between the separate ethno-religious 
communities that make up Iraq‘s population and within them. The result has been organizations and 
networks that are local and decentralized, small in scale, and with loose or non-existent ties between 
them. Within Iraq‘s Sunni community, these include groups affiliated with the former Baathist regime and 
led by former Baath party officials, intelligence operatives, and ex-military officers; nationalists who 
object to the U.S. occupation; Islamist and religious extremists groups; tribal-based resistance groups; and 
a foreign-led network affiliated with Al Qaeda (Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI). Divisions have also emerged 
within these categories. For example, the Baath party-based insurgency split into several factions, 
including al-Awda (The Return), the Fida‘iyin Saddam, and Jaish Muhammad (Muhammad‘s Army). 
There are also a wide range of Islamist factions such as Ansar al-Sunna, Ansar al-Islam, the 1920 
Revolution Brigades, and the Islamic Army in Iraq. According to Hashim (2008: 24), the ―presence of a 
plethora of insurgent groups in Iraq has had adverse implications for the articulation of a unified ideology 
and set of goals.‖  
In this context, what is the impact of new information about the expected future level of the U.S. 
commitment? Theory predicts that the effect of new information about future U.S. commitment is likely 
to be different in a decentralized insurgency than in a unified insurgency. Under conditions where there is 
                                                 
4 For a discussion on the distinctions between insurgency and other types of armed action, including terrorism, see 
Byman (2007). There is considerable debate about the definition of terrorism.  For a detailed discussion, see Krueger 
and Maleckova (2006). 
5 On the decentralized character of the Iraqi insurgency, see Hashim (2008), Tilgham (2007), Hashim (2006), and 
Eisenstadt and White (2005). The total size of the insurgency has varied. According to one set of estimates, in 2005 
the insurgency consisted of at least 40,000 hardcore fighters, out of a total of more than 200,000 part-time fighters 
and volunteers who provide intelligence, logistics and shelter. See GlobalSecurity.org (2005)    8 
asymmetry in the information available to various insurgent groups, in a decentralized, competitive 
setting we predict differential responses by groups with more information about the future level of US 
commitment.  
To understand why, consider a model of insurgent action where insurgent groups seek to 
maximize their power and influence over the state and society. Insurgent organizations use violence and 
terrorism not only to impose costs on the occupying force, but also as a tactic to build support and 
establish power relative to competing groups, with the goal of maximizing their influence as the influence 
of the occupying force declines or withdraws completely.  This is similar to a situation in which multiple 
interest groups or political parties vie for influence or vote share.  Insurgent groups similarly use violence 
to compete for recruits, popular support, money, and visibility – e.g., for a greater share of the market for 
rebellion.
6 McCormick (2003:488) observes that violent extremist groups ―compete with each other in 
radical rivalries for political market share…terrorism is not merely an instrument of competition with the 
state, but a means of crowding out one‘s political rivals.‖ In situations where the occupying force is 
unambiguously dominant, there are smaller returns to being the second or third place group, and thus less 
incentive to compete over relative position. If, however, the first place group (in this case, the United 
States military) is weaker, the expected returns from being in a stronger relative position increases, 
creating a greater incentive outbid rival groups for political market share through violence.  This view 
generates the testable empirical implication that insurgent attacks should increase when the occupying 
country reduces its level of commitment or moves closer to the margin of withdrawal. New information 
that reduces the expected future level of U.S. involvement therefore leads decentralized insurgent groups 
to initiate a higher level of violence than they otherwise would have. 
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
                                                 
6 On this ―market share‖ view of insurgent competition, see Bloom (2005) and McCormick (2003). Based on 
interviews, documents, and propaganda generated by Iraqi insurgents, the International Crisis Group (2006) found 
that ―competition between groups for greater visibility generated increasingly bloody and controversial deeds,‖ 
particularly in the early phases of the insurgency.  For a critique of the evidence for this argument in the context of 
Palestinian terrorism, see Brym and Araj (2008).   9 
To identify the effect of new information about the level of U.S. commitment and the likelihood 
of withdrawal on insurgent behavior in Iraq‘s multi-group setting, we combine data on the release of 
American public opinion polls with variation in access to U.S. media in Iraq.  Specifically, we use 
differences in the penetration of satellite TV across the 18 provinces of Iraq and the fact that satellite 
television provides more direct information about the direction of U.S. policy.   Under the intuition that 
areas with greater exposure to U.S. and international media will more be more responsive to new 
information about the expected future level of US commitment, we use a measure of access to satellite 
television as an instrument for the rapidity of information diffusion. This estimation method relies on the 
importance of opinion polls in providing salient information about the likelihood of U.S. withdrawal. 
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we compare the effect of poll releases on insurgent behavior in 
regions with higher versus lower levels of satellite penetration.   
We use satellite television because it is an important source of information in post-Saddam Iraq, 
and therefore a useful proxy for access to information about U.S. commitment.  Prior to the U.S. invasion 
in 2003, Iraqis were banned from owning satellite television and had access only to state-run news 
stations. After the collapse of Baathist-run television stations, Iraqis were ―starve[d] for information,‖ and 
the sale of satellite dishes ―skyrocketed in the months following the invasion, leading to one of the 
highest penetration rates in the world in just two years.‖
7 Despite high overall penetration levels, access 
rates vary geographically. According to a media poll by United Kingdom‘s Office of Intelligence and 
Research, while nearly all (93%) Iraqis report owning a television, only about a third (33%) have access 
to a satellite dish (defined as availability at home, a friend's residence, or at work).  The two-thirds (62%) 
of Iraqis report that they have no access satellite television tend to be less educated and poorer.
8   
In addition, the content of satellite television is heavily dominated by foreign, and in particular 
U.S., content.  This developed for two reasons. First, emerging television networks are heavily regulated 
                                                 
7 As of 2006, Iraqis with satellite television had access to over 300 satellite channels. For details on the emergence 
of Iraqi satellite television, see Cochrane 2006 and Bahadur 2005. 
8 Significantly, post-college graduates are three times more likely to have access to satellite television than those 
with a primary education or lower.  A summary of results is available at 
http://www.stanhopecentre.org/iraqmediapoll.shtml.   10 
by the Iraqi government.  For a brief but critical period of time in 2003 and 2004, the CPA banned 
stations that they believed incited anti-U.S. violence, resulting in predominantly U.S.-based content.
9  In 
2004, the Iraqi Interim Government set up a Higher Media Commission to regulate and license television 
stations.  This Commission increased foreign- (and largely U.S.) based content and banned Arab stations 
deemed to be anti-U.S., such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya.
10 Second, one of the most widely available 
TV stations is the U.S.-sponsored Al Iraqiyah, which began satellite broadcasting in October 2003. In 
January 2004, the U.S. Defense Department awarded the Harris Corporation, a Florida-based 
communications firm, a 12-month contract to manage the Iraqi Media Network, including Al Iraqiyah, 
which provides access to American programming.
11  Al Iraqiya‘s detailed content on U.S. issues relative 
to other sources is also due to the privileged status it was afforded by Coalition forces and the CPA 
(Cochrane, 2006).  One indicator of the dominance of U.S. media content is the opposition of Iraqi 
religious groups and leaders to greater satellite TV access in Iraq following the U.S. invasion, which they 
hold has increased the availability of Western and un-Islamic material (Bahadur 2005). The dominance of 
Western news and entertainment is evident of the availability of shows like ABC‘s Extreme Makeover 
Home Edition or the British show Pop Idol (Cochrane, 2006: 13). 
An obvious concern with using satellite television variation is the underlying reason why satellite 
access varies by province. While some variation is related to the underlying wealth of the population, 
much of the regional variation is due to the constraints created by existing technology and infrastructure. 
Regions may have limited or no satellite network access for several technological reasons unrelated to 
either violence or socioeconomic characteristics.
12 The first reason relates to the efficiency of the 
technology under use. Due to the high capital costs of deploying a satellite network and the relatively 
                                                 
9 Aljazeera.Net, September 23, 2003.   
10 Cochrane (2006).
 For a discussion of popular Arab media, see Watanabe (2003).  For a sample of media content, 
see http://www.publicagenda.com/press/clips/cfpi4_clips_ais.pdf, http://alsumaria.com/en/iraq-files/us-iraq.php 
11 Although Al Iraqiyah has steadily improved the quality of its programming since early 2004, the network still 
offers few hours of original content. Among the original programs are daily news hour shows with detailed 
information on U.S. media watched by many, despite skepticism about its objectivity due to it close ties with the 
United States. 
12 Much of this discussion is based on information from Blue Iraq, a company that operates a satellite network with 
reach throughout Iraq.  Their primary market is supporting Western military and commercial reconstruction efforts 
throughout the country, as well as NGOs, Iraqi organizations, and private businesses. Information obtained from: 
http://www.blueiraq.com/.   11 
limited size of the satellite market, vendors often do not update their systems as new technology becomes 
available that can manage a greater volume of traffic and provide more efficient performance at the same 
cost. The second issue relates to subscription management by carrier. A satellite network must be sized 
for a given capacity, with most sites transmitting at less than full capacity most of the time. To avoid 
service interruptions, many network carriers therefore limit the number of customers they add to their 
networks.  Third, satellite networks are designed around specific parameters, including coverage area and 
customer traffic profiles. Because there were many mismatched systems - that is, systems that were sold 
for purposes for which they were not designed - many areas in Iraq have difficulty accessing satellite 
television, which deters take-up.  A fourth problem relates to the interaction between satellite network 
technology and environmental factors.  Satellite links are designed around a specific "link budget" to 
provide reliable communications in a variety of environmental conditions.  These links require the correct 
interactive technology, which is often not available in Iraq. Because of these ―tight margins‖ on satellite 
links and the use of inferior equipment, undersized antennas, or insufficient error correction on such links, 
access in some regions will be problematic in poor environmental or other extreme weather conditions. 
The implication of these technology constraints is that individuals with similar tastes and characteristics, 
who may have the same desire to adopt satellite television, will do so differently in different regions due 
to different costs and technological limitation. Thus, even if the access of any given individual is affected 
by income or a desire for information, the variation in the province level measure nonetheless reflects the 
relative ease of access for the region. 
A second possible criticism of these measures is that insurgent groups pay little attention to media 
sources in planning attacks. However, reports indicate that insurgents in Iraq are particularly watchful of 
the media, and that the tactics used by al Qaeda in particular heavily rely on the propaganda potential of 
large media sources. According to Bruce Hoffman, ―What I think has made the insurgency in Iraq so 
different from previous ones is the insurgents' enormous media savvy.‖
13 Others have documented, based 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Ross (2006).   12 
on insurgent-generated media such as websites, the extent to which Iraqi insurgent groups are detailed 
consumers of news on U.S. politics and policy (Kimmage and Ridolfo, 2007: 88). 
The crux of the identification strategy is that insurgent groups are decentralized and get 
information based largely on where they live, and not through a centralized network structure. This 
assumption also seems to be in line with the general intelligence information available on the Iraqi 
insurgency.
14  While the assumption that insurgent access to information in Iraq is decentralized appears 
reasonable given the information known about the insurgency, if a central coordinating body with better 
access to information determines violence levels, then this identification will fail to capture the causal 
mechanism of interest – either because there is no difference in information access across provinces or 
because the insurgency is able to determine the allocation of violence simultaneous to the television 
programming. To the extent that insurgents are small in scale and news takers, as opposed to only news 
makers, any differential changes in attack behavior across high- and low-access areas might reasonably be 
interpreted as a response to information about U.S. policies.  
The data used in this estimation was compiled from a variety of sources, in part by ourselves and in 
part by Greenstone (2007). To measure U.S. military casualties, we use counts obtained directly from the 
Department of Defense (DOD), which releases information on the date, location, and type of attack of 
each fatal casualty.
15 This data excludes non-fatal casualties, which the DOD does not make public on 
privacy grounds. It also excludes ―non-hostile‖ fatalities, which comprise about 19 % of all U.S. military 
deaths in Iraq. To measure Iraqi civilian casualties, we aggregate attacks reported by the Iraq Body Count 
(IBC) organization, which maintains an ongoing database of attacks targeted at Iraqi civilians in which at 
least one fatality occurred (Dardogan and Sloboda, 2006). These include attacks on all individuals 
classified under international law as noncombatants, including civilians, Iraqi police and security forces, 
and government officials and political figures. The IBC includes only those incidents in which two media 
                                                 
14 See note 4 above. 
15 Available at http://icasualties.org/oif/HNH.aspx. There has been substantial controversy over attempts to measure 
excess violent civilian deaths in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. Most disagreement, for example over a 2006 study 
reported in the medical journal The Lancet which placed this figure around 601,000, concerns attempts to estimate 
this number through samples of household surveys administered directly in Iraq. We avoid these problems by using 
direct counts of military and civilian deaths compiled by the IBC and the Department of Defense.   13 
sources separately report a death, and provides a minimum and maximum estimated number of deaths 
when sources conflict.
16 For the purposes of this paper we use the estimated minimum number of deaths 
for any given attack.  We use two counts of the number of attacks and cross-check for consistency.  First, 
we aggregate the number of incidents in any given week from the combined DOD and Iraqi civilian data.  
Second, we use monthly data on insurgent-initiated attacks on U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians from the 
Brookings Iraq Index.
17 
As described above, we use the release of major public opinion polls to measure changes in 
information available to insurgents about the expected future level of U.S. commitment in the conflict.   
These polls capture American attitudes towards key issues in the war in Iraq, such as whether the U.S. 
should increase or decrease its force levels, whether they view the war as a success, whether they support 
the president‘s handling of the war, and whether they view the number military casualties as acceptable. 
These polls show a steady decline in support for the U.S troop presence in Iraq. However, unlike other 
possible signals of U.S. commitment – such as media coverage or debate among U.S. leaders - the timing 
of the release of polls is plausibly unrelated to the conditions on the ground in Iraq, even if broad changes 
in public support for the war are to some degree affected by the level of violence.
18   There are several 
reasons to believe that poll releases are independent of prior trends in insurgent violence. Major media 
organizations want to produce regular series of polls to track public opinion, regardless of the status of the 
war, and as a result conduct polls in regular intervals. Media organizations are also driven by financial 
pressures and the desire to retain credibility in a competitive media market to report polls as soon as they 
have been conducted and vetted by in-house checkers.
19  In fact, most polls are released within one week 
                                                 
16 These data exclude large numbers of unidentified bodies at morgues in major cities such as Bagdad, Kirkuk, 
Mosul, and Tikrit.  These bodies could not be linked to any specific number of attacks or causes but media accounts 
suggest these may be the result of Shia militia responses to Sunni groups. On the improved ability of insurgent 
groups to conceal killings from Iraqi authorities, see Dehghanpisheh 2007.    
17 Available at http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx. 
18 On the debate over whether U.S. public support for the war is driven by solely by trends in casualties, see Feaver, 
Gelpi, and Reifler (2005/06) and Mueller (2005).  
19 In fact, recent work suggests that the financial pressures frequently generate premature releases (Mann, Orren, 
Shorenstein 1992).   After the 2004 U.S. presidential election, concern about polling methodology forced many large 
media organizations to establish in-house standards (Daves and Newport, 2005).  See, for example, ABC News 
Polling and Methodology Standards, available at abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/poll_methodology.html.   14 
of being conducted, although the set-up prior to the launch takes several weeks.
20  This timeline makes 
releasing polls immediately prior to high attack period highly unlikely. Also, questions about Iraq are 
frequently coupled in polls with other questions on unrelated issues.  We track the release of major media-
sponsored polls and treat the week of releases as ―high information‖ weeks, and weeks without poll 
releases as ―low information.‖  We also verify that information about these polls was discussed on 
network broadcasts via satellite television using online transcripts from Al-Iraqiya. 
As a way of confirming that the polls in fact contained new or surprising information, we test whether 
the release of public opinion polls on the war in Iraq significantly changed the predicted probability of a 
Democratic candidate winning the presidential election in 2008 according to data from Intrade, a 
prediction market that allows individuals to bet on the probability of an outcome.  Data on the probability 
of a victory by a Democratic presidential candidate is based on the Intrade series from November 2, 2004 
to  November 1, 2007.
21 Assuming that the probability of a Democratic victory in 2008 was related to 
public opinion on the war in Iraq, a key issue in the election, we can observe whether the polls revealed 
new information about U.S. attitudes towards the war. Figure 3 shows the Intrade market series on the 
probability of a Democratic presidential victory, the number of trades on this prediction by week, and the 
release of polls. Unfortunately, only the period from November 2006 to November 2007 has enough trade 
volume and sufficient variation to make a judgment about the impact of new Iraq polling. For each poll 
released in these 12 months, we conduct an event study to test if the prices in the 14 days after the poll 
release have a statistically significantly (at the 0.05 level) different price than the 14 days prior to the poll 
release.  In this period, 75 % of the Iraq polls releases resulted in a significant change in the In-trade price 
of a Democratic presidential victory.  
To measure satellite TV access in Iraq, we use data collected by the World Food Program‘s survey on 
"Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq." This survey, conducted in latter part of 2005, asked 
respondents about humanitarian and household issues, including whether a respondent owned a satellite 
                                                 
20 For example, CBS polls often are released within days of data collection.  For CBS/New York Times polling 
methodology, see:  http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/07/02/opinion/main299401.shtml 
21 Intrade data is available until November 2008, but our data set on attacks and fatalities in only compiled until the 
end of 2007.   15 
television dish.
22 We use data collected at the district level (the main sub-province administrative unit in 
Iraq), and then construct a weighted average of satellite access for each of the 18 provinces.
23 
Finally, in order to compare regions with different levels of satellite access by other characteristics 
that might plausibly affect violence levels, we use a broad set of social and economic variables collected 
in the Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2005 by the United Nations Development Program and the Central 
Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Ministry of Planning and Development 
Cooperation in Iraq.
 24  Descriptive variables included are population density, household size, average 
number of displaced persons, median household income, access to safe and stable drinking water, 
malnutrition rate, literacy rate, net primary school attendance, unemployment rate, and median hourly 
wage.  We also classify each province by ethno-religious group (predominantly Sunni, predominantly 
Shia, predominantly Kurd, or mixed), based on population estimates constructed by the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
IV. RESULTS 
We begin our analysis with a set of descriptive statistics about trends in violence levels in Iraq.  
Figure 1A shows the number of attacks in each province per week over time, and Figure 1B shows the 
number of U.S. military and Iraqi civilian casualties in each province by week over the same period. A 
full exploration of the structure of insurgent violence in Iraq is beyond the scope of this paper, but these 
figures provide contextual information on aggregate trends in violence.  There was a large increase in the 
number of attacks and fatalities beginning in the middle of 2005.  This increased dramatically until the 
winter of 2006-2007, when it began declining.  While we do not discuss the strategic reasons for these 
shifts, we can describe the associated changes in technology related to the increase beginning in 2005.  
The bimodal distribution (as shown in the noticeably higher disjointed set of scatter points in Figure 1B) 
                                                 
22 Results do not differ significantly when using the UK State Department Survey asking whether respondents had 
access to satellite television at home, at a friend‘s house or at work.  Results for these specifications available upon 
request. 
23 The weights first use the sample weights to construct district average access levels. We then weight each district 
by the fraction of the province population residing in that district. 
24 This survey took place in the second half of 2005 and was a follow-up to a post-invasion food security survey.  
For details on methods see http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf 
.   16 
in fatalities is likely due to an increase in the use of bombs and indirect fire, such as mortar or rocket 
attacks.  This also results in greater variance in attacks, which is correlated with the increase in the level 
of attacks (rather than simply a time-related dynamic). Higher variance periods and periods where there is 
a bimodality in fatalities are both associated with a higher fraction of attacks using bombs, and so may in 
part be technology-driven.  However, higher variance may also be a strategic choice by the insurgents, 
under the belief that clusters of attacks are more destabilizing than spread out attacks.    
  The series in Figure 2 tracks the release of public opinion polls containing questions about 
attitudes towards the war in Iraq.  As discussed, public opinion polls are arguably released at times 
independent of the amount of violence in the preceding weeks. While the content of the polls may be 
affected by violence, we measure the actual release date and observe how the change in information about 
the existing public support for maintaining troops in Iraq affects future levels of violence. Comparing 
Figures 1 and 2, there does not appear to be a clear correlation between poll release timing and the 
aggregate level of attacks.  
  The diffusion of information occurs across regions based on satellite TV access. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics about provinces with high (above 50 %) and low satellite access. There do appear to 
be differences between the regions. In particular, high satellite access provinces tend to have more attacks 
and fatalities, denser population centers, and are slightly richer.   They also have larger number of 
displaced persons due to the war.  While the regions are similar in other characteristics, such as nutrition 
and literacy rates, these differences are somewhat concerning.  As a result, we construct a second test 
using only a subset of provinces that are better matched on a set of observables, including population 
density, literacy, unemployment rates, and malnutrition rates.  In this restricted province sample, 
provinces in the high satellite category are Anbar, Babil, Ninawa, and Tamim.  Provinces in the low 
satellite category are Diyala, Karbala, Najaf, and Salah ad Din. This more restricted set of provinces also 
excludes the Kurdish provinces (where there is minimal violence) and the province of Basrah (which was 
monitored by British forces during the period of analysis).  The provinces with high satellite access have 
on average 10.88 attacks per week and the low satellite access provinces have on average 11.49 attacks,   17 
with no significant difference between the two groups. The provinces are also not significantly different 
in terms of the observables listed in Table 1. 
From column (3) in Table 1, it is apparent that Baghdad is an extreme outlier on a host of 
characteristics, including population density, frequency of attacks, and various socioeconomic indicators.  
As such, we exclude Baghdad from subsequent analysis.  While necessary on methodological grounds, 
excluding Baghdad might raise other concerns about the applicability of the subsequent analysis.  
Baghdad does represent a substantial fraction - approximately 35 percent - of overall violence in Iraq.  
However, there remains a large amount of violence (65%, or about 5 people killed per day) in the rest of 
the country.  In terms of casualties confirmed by the Department of Defense, the non-Baghdad areas of 
Iraq in our data account for 2,778 U.S. military deaths, still a substantial number. In addition, although 
Baghdad represents a major population center and a strategic target, our analysis does include other major 
population centers such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Najaf, and areas that were or continue to be at the center of 
the Sunni insurgency such as Tikrit, Ramadi, Samarra, and Fallujah. Our analysis also includes other 
strategically valuable areas such as the oil-producing regions in the South. 
Table 2 provides estimates of the main specification, and divides the sample into three periods. 
Columns (1) – (3) present estimates of attacks on a continuous variable for satellite television access, an 
indicator for  poll release weeks, and indicators for the weeks before and after high information weeks. 
These indicators are all interacted with the satellite variable.  All specifications include both province and 
week fixed effects. There is no significant difference between provinces with varying satellite access 
following high and low information weeks in Period 1, but there is a significant difference in Periods 2 
and 3, with the coefficients implying that a 10 percent increase in satellite access increases the number of 
attacks by 6.5 % in Period 2 and by 13% in Period 3. The effect in Period 1 is smaller and not significant.  
Columns (4) through (6) and (7) through (9) in Table 2 report the effect of poll releases on 
civilian and military fatalities. Following poll release weeks, there appears to be an increase in the number 
of fatalities incurred by U.S. military forces and a decrease in the number of Iraqi civilian fatalities in 
higher satellite access areas compared to lower access areas.  The effect sizes suggest a large change in   18 
fatalities, although the point estimates are relatively imprecise.  A 10 percent increase in satellite 
television access is associated with a 20 to 30 percent reduction in civilian fatalities in the following week 
in Periods 2 and 3, and an increase in U.S. military fatalities by 40 to 50 percent.  These estimates seem 
large given the change in attack levels of only 6-13 percent, but the large standard errors make the 
magnitude of the effects more difficult to interpret.  
The post-poll change in the pattern of fatalities provides insight into the increased attacks. After 
the release of a poll, there is an increase in attacks and an increase in U.S. military fatalities, but a 
decrease in the total number of fatalities. Because U.S. targets are ―hardened‖ and thus more difficult to 
kill, insurgents may not invest in doing so unless the returns are sufficiently high.  The perceived increase 
in returns after poll releases may increase the willingness of insurgents to try to target U.S. military 
personnel. One possible interpretation of the decrease in overall fatalities is that insurgent groups are 
shifting to increased attacks on U.S. military targets - which are harder and may necessitate more attacks - 
and thus the additional attacks produce less total fatalities.  The trade-off in fatalities is not one-to-one, 
which is also consistent with the idea that U.S. targets are harder to successfully attack.   The results in 
Table 2 are therefore consistent with strategic action by insurgents to increase attacks after the U.S. public 
produces greater information about declining future influence. 
To address concerns that regions with high and low satellite access are different in other 
characteristics that might plausibly be related to insurgent activity, Table 2 Panel B compares a sub-set of 
the provinces that are more closely matched on a set of observables.  We restrict our sample to provinces 
with similar characteristics, including household size, average number of displaced persons, median 
household income, malnutrition, literacy, labor force participation, and average hourly wages, and, as 
noted earlier, excluding the Kurdish-majority areas and Basrah. In this restricted province sample, 
provinces with more than 50 percent of the population reporting access to satellite television are Anbar, 
Babil, Ninawa, and Tamim.  Provinces reporting lower satellite access are Diyala, Karbala, Najaf, and 
Salah ad Din.  The effect sizes in these estimates are substantially smaller and more precisely estimated.  
These estimates imply a larger effect on attacks than in the general sample—a 10 percent increase in   19 
satellite access increases attack levels about 40-50 percent in the following week.  The coefficients in the 
fatalities results also increase dramatically but remain large in percent terms. 
Table 3 shows the dynamics of the insurgency‘s response to new information about U.S. public 
opinion over a period of 4 weeks, using the full province sample. Prior to poll release weeks, attacks are 
on average lower in high satellite regions compared to low satellite regions. In the week of the poll 
release, attacks are not significantly different, but, consistent with Table 2, in the week after a release 
higher satellite areas experience higher attack levels compared to lower satellite areas. This effect 
declines in the second and third week, and by the fourth week the differences between high and low 
satellite provinces are small in magnitude and insignificant. There is a similar qualitative trend in terms of 
U.S. fatalities, but the effects are smaller and less precisely estimated. In Period 2 there appears to be no 
significant difference between one week before and one week after the poll release. In Period 3, there is a 
significant difference in the week after, and, as in the attacks result, this effect dissipates by the fourth 
week.   
Overall, the evidence from Tables 2 and 3 suggests that there is a spike in attacks following new 
information regarding the expected probability of future U.S. withdrawal, but that this difference between 
regions dissipates over subsequent weeks.  This spike is consistent with strategic behavior by insurgent 
groups: when the returns to insurgent attacks are higher, and in particular when the returns to inflicting 
U.S. military fatalities are higher, Iraqi insurgent groups increase efforts to attack U.S. targets.  This 
increase lasts for about 2 weeks, after which there is no significant difference between high and low 
satellite regions. A concern highlighted in these results is that the coefficient estimated in the attacks 
results and the civilian fatalities results suggest a similar sized (albeit insignificant) effect the week before 
polls are released.  This effect is insignificant in all but one specification.  We will explicitly address 
concerns about reverse causality in the next section. In addition, to test the causal channel via satellite 
access we estimate a similar specification using Al-Jazeera reports.  Because Al-Jazeera is not available 
on satellite and has broad market penetration across Iraq, we would not expect to find any significant   20 
different in high and low satellite regions.  The results suggest that there is some unique information 
provided on satellite television which is used and not shared by competing insurgent groups.
25 
 
V.  ALTERNATE EXPLANATION AND SOURCES OF BIAS 
The strategy used to identify the relationship between new information contained in U.S. public 
opinion polls and insurgent violence relies on several assumptions that may appear problematic.  In this 
section we address several possible concerns.  
Reverse Causation:  Because we assume that ―high information weeks‖ are independent of the 
underlying factors that also drive violence, our identification strategy is susceptible to concerns about 
reverse causation.  Our analysis addresses this issue in several ways. First, although U.S. opinion towards 
the war to some extent reflects violence levels in Iraq, the actual release of opinion polls and their 
promotion in the media are likely to be independent of week-to-week changes in violence, as described 
above.
26 Second, in all specifications we use a lagged term week indicator interacted with satellite access. 
Third, to further support the conclusion that the results are not biased by reverse causation, we conduct a 
Granger causality test of attack levels on poll releases.  This tests how well the level of attacks in previous 
periods predicts the release of polls.  The results of this test provide evidence against reverse causation, as 
attacks do not Granger-cause poll releases.
27  
Third Factor Causation—Military Strategic Value: We assume that provinces that vary on the 
satellite access measure are comparable in terms of violence except for satellite access—that is, we make 
a parallel trend assumption. To the extent that provinces with high satellite television are associated with 
other factors that might drive violence, then this strategy will fail to identify the causal relationship.  To 
address concerns about third factor causation, we interact the poll release variable with other province 
level variables that could potentially explain our effect, such as ethnic composition and the strategic 
                                                 
25 Results of this specification check and the details of the Al-Jazeera transcript search are presented in Appendix 
Table 1. 
26 In addition, for evidence that public opinion is not primarily driven by the level of casualties, see Gelpi, Feaver, 
and Riefler 2006. 
27 The asymptotic Chi-squared statistics (p-values), from 1-4 lags, are chi2(1)=0.72 (0.60), chi2(2)=0.82 (0.34), 
chi2(3)= 3.34 (0.66), and chi2(4)=5.02 (0.60), respectively.    21 
importance of different areas (presented in Table 4). These exercises test whether the estimates of the 
effect of poll-related information rely on the variation in satellite access and not variation in some other 
province-level variable.  To do this, we require a variable which may be plausibly associated with higher 
levels of attacks but not collinear with the satellite access variable. Intuitively, areas with some strategic 
value may have different responses to information about U.S. withdrawal than non-strategic areas.  In 
Iraq, a major indicator of strategic value is the presence of oil.  We therefore interact a continuous 
variable for the fraction of total Iraqi oil produced in the province with the poll release variable.   Oil 
production varies substantially across Iraq, and the correlation of production level and satellite access is 
0.4.  There are substantially more attacks in low oil producing regions relative to high oil regions (13.1 
versus 5.6), which is consistent with a higher U.S. emphasis on protecting ―high oil‖ regions.  If satellite 
access is really picking up the effect of strategic value, the oil variable should produce similar results to 
the satellite variable. Table 4 shows that there does not appear to be a significant effect across oil 
producing regions following poll releases, in part because the standard errors on the estimates are 
sizeable. 
Third Factor Causation—Ethnic Divisions: A similar concern could be raised about the 
relationship between satellite access and the ethnic composition of regions. We therefore conduct a 
similar exercise using ethnic identity, measured by whether a province is ―predominantly Sunni‖ 
(presented in columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table 5). If there are differences in responses to new U.S. 
information by ethnicity (or satellite variation is in some way driven by ethnic differences), then our 
causal interpretation is false.  If the variation in satellite access is identifying supply-side factors for the 
insurgency, then ethnic composition should perform at least as well, if not better, in generating higher 
attack rates in the subsequent periods.  Most Sunni Arabs reside in central Iraq, including the ―Sunni 
Triangle,‖ an area that stretches northwest of Baghdad and encompasses Tikrit, Ramadi, Samarra, and 
Fallujah. At least half of Iraq‘s Sunni community lives in large cities such as Baghdad or Mosul. There 
are more attacks in ―high Sunni‖ areas, consistent with the Sunni population participating in and aiding 
insurgent-led attacks. In Periods 1 and 2, there is no significant effect of poll releases on attack rates in   22 
Sunni areas. There does appear to be an effect in Period 3, although this effect is eliminated when 
controlling for satellite access. 
Plausibility of a Week-to-Week Response: We assume a relatively short time-frame for the 
response to information about U.S. commitment, and specifically that a week with a poll release will 
produce an insurgent response in the following week.  We attempt to minimize concerns about this 
assumption in several ways.  First, Table 3 conducts a sensitivity analysis, varying the response time to 2 
to 4 weeks.  We find that after a two week window the effect diminishes over time. By the third week, 
there appears to be no significant difference between provinces.  However, the results cannot rule out an 
alternative interpretation of a timing substitution response - insurgent groups may have a greater ability to 
shift the timing of attacks rather than increase the overall amount of attacks they can produce. This 
response may be more plausible on a week-to-week basis. Another explanation could be that there are a 
large number of groups in any given region that have the potential to participate in violence.  In periods 
with little motivation, these groups do not mobilize frequently and as a result only a fraction of these 
groups are actually participating.  In this scenario, information about U.S. withdrawal serves as a 
mobilization incentive, motivating a larger fraction of groups to participate.  Thus, while each group is 
producing the same amount of violence, the total number of groups engaged in violence may have 
increased, raising the total amount of attacks. Third, substitution is limited by input factors and thus may 
not be the only margin along which insurgent groups adjust.  There is little doubt that insurgent groups 
are media savvy, and, to that end, are likely to seek not only the lowest cost means of producing attacks 
but also the highest return for any given attack or set of attacks.  This suggests the media salience of 
increases in American fatalities makes short-term effects more likely.  Finally, the use of a one-week 
window is a plausible but arbitrary assumption needed to limit the scope of the study. Future research can 
examine different versions of this argument over longer or even shorter time frames, or how insurgent 
groups determine the timing of their response. 
 
   23 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper addresses two important questions in the growing research literature on internal 
conflicts and insurgencies: how are insurgencies organized, and how do their organizational 
characteristics affect their behavior?  Like many recent civil conflicts, the insurgency in Iraq involves a 
decentralized organizational structure rather than the hierarchical, command and control systems that 
have characterized traditional insurgent organizations. This paper presents evidence supporting the 
argument that, in this context, new information about a possible future decline in U.S. influence 
intensifies inter-group competition. Using variation in satellite television access as an exogenous source 
of variation in information, we find that information shocks have a dramatic causal impact on the number 
of violent attacks and fatalities.  In the weeks after the release of public opinion polls, attacks increase by 
15 percent and U.S. military fatalities increase by almost 50 percent in Iraqi provinces with greater access 
to international news through satellite television. However, the changes in attack targeting due to 
competition between groups also provides some benefits.  Civilian fatalities fall by more than 25 percent, 
producing a decline in the overall level of fatalities resulting from insurgent violence. The increase in 
U.S. military deaths appears large in percent terms, but the magnitude when compared to civilian fatalities 
is smaller: in most periods, a 50 percent increase translates into less than one additional death per 
province per week. These results appear to be concentrated in the two weeks after information shocks and 
imply that the information diffusion rate occurs within a 4-week window. 
The differential response between regions in Iraq to the release of new information suggests that 
the insurgency in Iraq is decentralized with high degree of inter-group competition.  This evidence also 
suggests additional areas of research on insurgent organizational behavior, particularly in relation to the 
preferences of the wider noncombatant population.  Several national public opinion surveys conducted in 
Iraq suggest that while Iraqis support the goal of expelling U.S. and coalition forces from the country and 
may support violence to advance that goal, many also disapprove of high levels of civilian fatalities.
28  
This distaste may grow when such fatalities are not necessary for a victory over the United States.  The 
                                                 
28 See Program on International Policy Attitudes (2006) and International Republican Institute (2006)    24 
evidence is consistent with insurgent groups moving along with this change in public support. Further 
research might investigate the links between group competition, public support, and the withdrawal of 
occupation forces.  
The implications of this research are potentially important from a public policy perspective: if a 
short term change in information changes the strategy of competing insurgent groups, then it may be 
possible to use both outgoing information and competition between groups to better combat violent 
insurgent activity.  If insurgent groups are decentralized, then counterinsurgency strategies based on 
identifying and incapacitating a single command and control operation will be ineffective.  However, 
incentives-based strategies may be used to take advantage of inter-group rivalry and the need to compete 
for public support.  These conclusions should be taken with the cautionary note; given the complex nature 
of insurgencies and the limited empirical information available, further research is needed to better 
identify the causal channels through which various counterinsurgent activities affect insurgent behavior.    25 
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Figure 1B. Number of Fatalities in Iraqi Provinces each week 
Notes:  The number of attacks per province-week is defined as non-criminal acts which result in the death of one or 
more persons.  The data does not distinguish between Sunni insurgent attacks and Shia militia attacks.  Attacks 
which result in only injuries are not included.  Data and methods used to construct weekly attack counts are 
discussed in appendix A.   28 
Figure 2. Number of Public Opinion Polls released per week in major media outlets 
 
Notes: Polls included are polls available in Iraqi Satellite media outlets after release. Polls included are 
CNN/Gallup/USA Today polls, Fox, and CBS polls.  Details on the relevant questions included are available in 
Appendix A.  High mention poll weeks are:  Jan 19, 2005; Feb 9, 2005, Mar 2, 200, Jun 8, 2005; Jun 29, 2005; Aug 
10, 2005; Aug 31, 2005; Sep 14, 2005; Sep 21, 2005; Oct 12, 2005; Oct 26, 2005; Nov 2, 2005 ; Nov 16, 2005; Nov 
23, 2005; Jan 11, 2006; Jan 25, 2006; Mar 15, 2006;  Apr 12, 2006; Jun 14, 2006; Jun 28, 2006; Jul 26, 2006; Aug 2, 
2006; Sep 20, 2006; Dec 13, 2006 ; Jan 3, 2007; Jan 10, 2007; Jan 17, 2007; Feb 7, 2007; Feb 28, 2007; Apr 28, 
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November 7, 2006 
Period 3 
November 8, 2006-
November 1, 2007   29 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics about Regions by Satellite Access 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  High Satellite Access  Low Satellite 
Access 
Baghdad 





Najaf, Salah ad 
Din, Wasit 
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Regional Demographics       
Avg. Population Density 
(population per sq miles) 
98.16  82.11  8,929 
Pre-War Fraction Sunni  0.58  0.41  0.42 
       
Household Persons and Infrastructure Characteristics 
Household Size       
% of Population 
Displaced Due to War 
0.077  0.019  0.30 
Median Household 
Income (in Iraqi Dinars) 
116,341  101,661  100,000 
Safe, Stable Drinking 
water 
60.5  62  78 
Malnutrition Rate  0.12  0.13  0.11 
       
Education and Labor Market     
Literacy Rate  0.605  0.62  0.78 
Net Primary School 
Attendance 
0.77  0.70  0.79 
Unemployment Rate  0.084  0.096  0.014 
Median Hourly wage 
(Iraqi Dinar) 
931.3  913.3  833 
% of Households with 
Firearms 
0.24  0.32  0.26 
Notes: The number of attacks per province-week is defined as non-criminal acts which result in the death of one or 
more persons.  The data does not distinguish between Sunni insurgent attacks and Shia militia attacks.  Attacks which 
result in only injuries are not included.  Household characteristics are from UNDP Iraq Living Conditions Survey.  
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Table 2. Estimate of the Relationship between Attack Levels and Information on US Public Opinion (Excluding Baghdad) 





























Dependent Variable  Attacks per 100,000  Civilian Fatalities per 100,000  Military Fatalities per 100,000 
Mean  10.04  28.99  32.24  11.02  14.79  16.92  0.88  0.69  0.73 
Panel A: Full Sample                    
(satellite access)*(one week   0.21  0.81  1.01  -1.41  -2.65  -0.80  -0.03  -0.01  0.32 
before release)  (0.74)  (3.56)  (3.73)  (2.65)  (3.24)  (2.91)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.54) 
                   
(satellite access)*(release   -0.21  -0.47  4.82  2.33  -3.86**  0.02  -0.75  0.38*  -0.14 
week)  (2.22)  (3.92)  (6.03)  (2.65)  (1.86)  (4.63)  (0.51)  (0.22)  (0.14) 
                   
(satellite access)*(one week   1.44  1.91*    4.37**  -4.88**  -4.77**  -3.71*  -0.39  0.37**  0.32** 
after release)  (1.06)  (1.08)  (1.69)  (1.41)  (2.32)  (2.20)  (0.35)  (0.18)  (0.13) 
                   
R-squared  0.2931  0.4266  0.5124  0.1850  0.4157  0.3619  0.5412  0.7172  0.5036 
Observations  332  489  446  332  489  446  332  489  446 
Panel B: Restricted Sample                   
Dependent Variable Mean  4.60  14.51  14.67  8.88  13.58  18.65  0.69  0.47  0.54 
(satellite access)*(one week  0.12  -1.15  2.27  0.38  3.46  -0.08  0.17  0.12  0.55 
before release)  (2.30)  (7.79)  (8.37)  (5.45)  (4.56)  (9.46)  (0.50)  (0.30)  (0.54) 
                   
(satellite access)*(release  -1.09  -8.83  6.95  -3.77  0.97  14.91  -0.69  -0.20  0.16 
week)  (4.20)  (11.76)  (5.15)  (9.96)  (6.89)  (12.60)  (0.92)  (0.46)  (0.72) 
                   
(satellite access)*(one week  1.45  2.43*  7.63*  -2.01  -3.28**  -4.68**  -0.44  0.71**  0.85* 
after release)  (1.51)  (1.44)  (4.27)  (5.94)  (1.30)  (2.21)  (0.55)  (0.35)  (0.47) 
                   
R-squared  0.3145  0.4775  0.5317  0.3173  0.4842  0.5288  0.5595  0.6346  0.5793 
Observations  208  281  243  208  281  243  208  281  243 
Province FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Week FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients which are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with a 
**(*, ***).  Dependent Variable is the number of attacks per province-week. Also included in the regression, but not reported, are lag and lead indicator variables for 
poll release weeks, which are 1 if it is one week before and one week after a poll release week, respectively.  Control variables in specifications without province fixed 
effects include household size, average number of displaced persons, median household income, malnutrition rate, literacy rate, labor force participation rate, and   31 
average hourly wage.  Period 1 is November 2, 2004-November 8, 2005. Period 2 is November 9, 2005-November 7, 2006.  Period 3 is November 8, 2006-November 1, 
2007. The provinces included in the restricted province sample (Panel B) are Anbar, Babil, Ninawa, and Tamim, Diyala, Karbala, Najaf, and Salah ad Din.     32 
 
Table 3. Dynamics of Insurgent Response to Resolve Statements and Poll Releases 





























Dependent Variable  Attacks per 100,000  Civilian Fatalities per 100,000  Military Fatalities per 100,000 
Mean  10.04  28.99  32.24  11.02  14.79  16.92  0.88  0.69  0.73 
(satellite access)*(one week   -0.84  -1.82  5.03  1.63  -2.31  5.27  -0.36  0.35*  0.03 
Before release)  (1.91)  (4.90)  (3.78)  (3.27)  (4.04)  (4.17)  (0.29)  (0.19)  (0.25) 
                   
(satellite access)*(release  3.16  1.96  6.18  -2.32  -2.82  2.79  0.68  0.30  -0.11 
week)  (3.17)  (6.27)  (5.23)  (5.41)  (3.17)  (3.76)  (0.48)  (0.24)  (0.35) 
                   
(satellite access)*(one week  1.12    3.36**    4.56**  -4.18*  -5.28**  -5.93***  0.12  0.39**  0.35* 
after release)  (2.05)  (1.60)  (2.20)  (2.51)  (2.69)  (2.53)  (0.31)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
                   
(satellite access)*(two weeks  -5.65  3.62*  4.53  -8.06  -9.35**  -6.15*  0.87*  0.43*  0.36 
after release)  (5.22)  (1.98)  (2.71)  (5.62)  (4.76)  (3.33)  (0.49)  (0.22)  (0.24) 
                   
(satellite access)*(three weeks  0.09  2.99  1.77  -1.70  -3.90  2.11  0.72  -0.18  0.11 
after release)  (6.20)  (6.44)  (6.16)  (4.59)  (2.79)  (2.66)  (1.94)  (1.01)  (1.30) 
                   
(satellite access)*(four weeks  -1.18  1.44  1.15  -0.06  2.24  2.26  -0.26  0.46  0.21 
after release)  (4.89)  (4.73)  (5.17)  (6.35)  (8.61)  (6.73)  (0.74)  (1.33)  (1.00) 
                   
R-squared  0.2706  0.4008  0.4608  0.2623  0.3247  0.4947  0.5093  0.5779  0.4935 
Observations  332  489  446  332  489  446  332  489  446 
Province FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Week FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients which are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with a ** 
(*, ***).  Dependent Variable is the number of attacks per province-week. Attacks are defined as non-criminal acts which result in the death of one or more persons.  
The data does not distinguish between Sunni insurgent attacks and Shia militia attacks.  Attacks which result in only injuries are not included.  Data and methods used to 
construct weekly attack counts are discussed in the appendix.  All regressions include an interaction term that is equal to the satellite access variable one week before 
poll releases. Period 1 is November 2, 2004-November 8, 2005. Period 2 is November 9, 2005-November 7, 2006.  Period 3 is November 8, 2006-November 1, 2007.   33 
Table 4. Estimate of the Relationship between Attack Levels and Province Level Characteristics in Various Time Periods 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Dependent Variable  Attacks per 100,000 








(oil)*(one week before   0.04    -1.15  2.96      -6.48     
the poll release week)  (6.26)    (6.69)  (10.46)      (8.45)     
                   
(oil)*(poll release week)  1.19    4.91  -4.12      -8.74    -2.12 
  (5.65)    (5.95)  (10.28)      (8.39)    (10.29) 
                   
(oil)*(one week after   -0.76    2.94  3.54      -1.00    -5.27 
the poll release week)  (5.37)    (5.64)  (10.40)      (8.41)    (9.28) 
                   
(% Sunni)*(one week before     -0.30      3.57  3.00    -1.85   
the poll release week)    (1.75)      (3.34)  (2.07)    (3.02)   
                   
(% Sunni)*(poll release week)    0.82  1.74    7.23**  6.50    3.42  -4.84 
    (1.79)  (2.11)    (3.48)  (4.12)    (3.11)  (3.32) 
                   
(% Sunni)*(one week after     -0.45  2.62    1.67  3.02    -2.24  1.22 
the poll release week)    (1.72)  (1.87)    (3.47)  (4.11)    (3.09)  (3.30) 
                   
(satellite access)*(one week before       -0.42          -4.18      -1.97 
the poll release week)      (2.31)      (4.78)        (4.22)  
                   
(satellite access)*(poll      10.97**      5.07      10.36 
release week)      (4.57)      (9.94)      (8.67) 
                   
(satellite access)*(one week after       4.53      8.19*      13.13* 
the poll release week)      (3.32)      (4.98)      (6.90) 
                   
Province Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Week Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R-squared  0.2353  0.4132  0.4784  0.2274  0.4201  0.4890  0.25  0.41  0.47 
Observations  332  489  446  332  489  446  332  489  446   34 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients which are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with a ** 
(*, ***).  Dependent Variable is number of attacks per province-week. Attacks are defined as non-criminal acts which result in the death of one or more persons.  The 
data does not distinguish between Sunni insurgent attacks and Shia militia attacks.  Attacks which result in only injuries are not included.  Data and methods used to 
construct weekly attack counts are discussed in the appendix . The oil variable is defined as the percent of total Iraqi oil production located in the province (source: 
Revenue Watch Institute).  Period 1 is November 2, 2004-November 8, 2005. Period 2 is November 9, 2005-November 7, 2006.  Period 3 is November 8, 2006-
November 1, 2007.   35 
 APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES 
 
Data for this paper is available at people.rwj.harvard.edu/~riyengar/.  Questions about data and analysis may be 
directed to riyengar@rwj.harvard.edu or jonathan.monten@yale.edu. 
 
 
Attacks and Fatalities 
US Fatalities 
Daily data on coalition deaths comes from iCasualties.org. We downloaded the data from 
http://icasualties.org/oif/Details.aspx, which lists each death individually. We then aggregated the data by week.  
A fatality is included if any of the following occur:  
  a news story or obituary that reports the death of a US service member is released (this must also be 
confirmed by the DoD),  
  Centcom or the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF) releases the name of a soldier who has died 
(Centcom releases must be confirmed by the DoD), 
  the DoD itself releases the name of a soldier who has died,  
  the name of a soldier not already recorded appears in the weekly updated Department of Records listing 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) fatalities (http://icasualties.org/oif/Methodology.aspx). 
 
Iraqi Civilian Fatalities 
Our primary source for data on violent civilian fatalities comes from the IraqBodyCount.org (IBC) website. The 
principal researchers are Hamit Dardagan and John Sloboda. It is important to note that the website has a 
partisan orientation—that is, anti war—but their methodology is conservative and transparent, and seeks to 
provide an accurate lower bound for the number of violent civilian deaths reported. The data were downloaded 
from http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 
 
Once there are two news sources reporting an incident, two measures are constructed, reportedminimum and 
reportedmaximum.  If multiple numbers are reported, the lowest is entered as reportedminimum. This can be 
zero if ―zero deaths‖ is reported. However, a wording like ―unable to confirm any violent civilian deaths‖ is not 
a report of zero deaths and thus is not entered in either column. Moreover, when the report does not mention 
civilians specifically, this number is entered in the reportedmaximum variable but zero is entered into the 
reportedminimum variable unless the proportion of violent civilian deaths is given or a similar detail is given.) If 
a ―family‖ is reported killed, this is entered as three deaths. 
 
Poll Release Counts 
Identifying Polls to Count 
 
Included Polls 
  CNN/Gallup/USA Today 
  Fox 
  CBS 
 
Excluded Polls 
  PEW 
 
Relevant questions in included polls 
CNN/Gallup/USA Today 
―Which comes closest to your view about what the U.S. should now do about the number of U.S. troops in Iraq - 
the US should send more troops to Iraq, the U.S. should keep the number of troops as it is now, the U.S. should 
withdraw some troops from Iraq, or the U.S. should withdraw all of its troops from Iraq?‖ 
 
―Here are four different plans the U.S. could follow in dealing with the war in Iraq. Which one do you prefer: 
withdraw all troops from Iraq immediately, withdraw all troops by November, 2006 – that is, in 12 months time,   36 
withdraw troops, but take as many years to do it as are needed to turn control over to the Iraqis, or send more 
troops to Iraq?‖ 
 
Satellite Access Survey 
Satellite Access is a population weighted average of the number of individuals who report owning a 
satellite TV dish in the World Food Program "Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq" 
survey. The data is collected at the district level and was collected July-August 2005.  Details can be 
found at http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp193132.pdf. 
 


















































































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Volume of In-trade Market Trading and Predicted Probability of a Democratic Presidential Victory in 2008 
    38 
Appendix Table 1. Falsification Exercise  












Season   Post-Election 
Mean  10.04  28.99  32.24  10.04  28.99  32.24 
(satellite access)*(high mention   0.21  0.81  1.01  -0.28  -1.89  0.56 
week)  (0.74)  (3.56)  (3.73)  (1.52)  (1.25)  (3.96) 
             
(satellite access)*(one week   -0.21  -0.47  4.82  -1.19  -1.03  -0.65 
before the high mention week)  (2.22)  (3.92)  (6.03)  (3.55)  (1.38)  (1.22) 
             
(satellite access)*(one week   1.44  1.91*    4.37**  -1.40  -1.55  -1.03 
after the high mention week)  (1.06)  (1.08)  (1.69)  (1.71)  (5.13)  (3.21) 
             
   US Media  US Media  US Media  Al-Jazeera  Al-Jazeera  Al-Jazeera 
R-squared  0.2539  0.4263  0.4978  0.4218  0.5830  0.6695 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients which are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with a ** 
(*, ***).  Dependent Variable is number of attacks per province-week. Attacks are defined as non-criminal acts which result in the death of one or more persons.  The 
data does not distinguish between Sunni insurgent attacks and Shia militia attacks.  Attacks which result in only injuries are not included.  Data and methods used to 
construct weekly attack counts are discussed in the appendix . Al-Jazeera results are based on counts of statements in Al-Jazeera transcripts on the commitment of the 
US to remain in Iraq.  The search script is written in Ruby using the Mechanize and Hpricot libraries. It navigates through weekly transcripts, and iterates through a 
sequence of search terms, each of which combines a government official's name with one or more buzz words, e.g. "bush and embolden and iraq." For each search, the 
broadest range of articles available through ProQuest is returned, and then the script sorts the publication dates of the articles into a weekly tally, ranging from Jan 1, 
2003 to the present. For analysis purposes, the tallies are aggregated across search terms. Search Terms:  ―<Official‘s Name>‖ + ―Resolve!‖ ―<Official‘s Name>‖ + 
―embolden!‖ + ―insurg!‖. Officials included in the search are: President: George W. Bush; Vice-President: Richard Cheney;  Secretary of Defense: Donald Rumsfeld, 
Robert Gates; Secretary of State: Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice; US Commander in Iraq: Ricardo Sanchez, George W. Casey, David Petraeus; Press Secretary: Ari 
Fleischer, Scott McLellan, Tony Snow, Dana Perino. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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